Friday, December 17, 2010

Do People Actually Believe in Moral Objectivity? What Experimental Philosophy has to show us.

Here's an article by Joshua Knobe from Yale on whether or not people actually believe in moral objectivity: http://onthehuman.org/2010/12/objective-moral-truths/

Objectivity is one of my foremost interests in ethics. Well rather, non-objectivity is one of my foremost interests. I consider myself firmly an anti-realist regarding the existence of moral truths (meaning that I believe that there are no objectively correct moral truths. One version of this position is relativism which Knobe discusses at length, and subjectivism is another.)

One interesting facet of this article is how people's answers to the experimental questions change based on the experimental conditions. In the one case, when a person is a part of your community, a human, and capable of moral reasoning similar to their own, people are more likely to think that it is reasonable to pass an objective moral judgment in that case. When the situatuion is the same, but the person being judged is a part of another culture, people are less likely to pass an objective moral judgment. And finally, when the experimental conditions are changed entirely to the person being an alien, most people are unwilling to pass an objective moral judgment on the actions of an alien life form.

This part of the paper was very interesting to me because I have taken in interest in how it is that we distinguish between the different relevant characteristics of an actor that to determine whether or not a person can be morally judged by distinctively "human" standards.

Here's my idea: Lets say that people are ok holding other human beings to objective moral standards (leaving aside culture for now.) My question is: What are the characteristics that determine that a person can be filed under the class "human," and hence, be open to objective moral judgments by other humans? That is to say, how do we determine who is "human?" Clearly there is a biological basis, but biological similarities cannot do the entire job of telling us why certain types of moral reasoning (which deal with issues exterior to biology, like making a decision between alternatives for example) would be universally applicable to all humans. And on top of that, would biological dissimilarity exempt someone from moral judgment?

We could instead talk about similarities in human "rationality" as a number of ethicists have, but all such justifications seem to get bogged down in the moral judgments of their time and happen to file their moral preconceptions into the notion of how it is "rational" to act. (There is surely more to be said here, but I'll leave it aside for now.)
But my question is: Given human evolution (both physical and mental) how is it that one knows that the person that one is passing moral judgment on is "human" in the same way they are? Would a neurological or psychological dissimilarity between two people be enough to disqualify them as the same type of "human?" How much dissimilarity qualifies someone to no longer be considered "human?"
I am open to the possibility that humanness is a transitory state, and that the degrees to which it is being overcome through biological evolution and psychological evolution via culture cannot be objectively distinguished in the course of deciding to pass a moral judgment on someone that is to be considered objectively binding. That is to say, we have no definite basis upon which to determine others' similarity or dissimilarity to ourselves when it comes to passing moral judgments.

Regarding morals, why have we allowed ourselves to think that moral judgments apply to beings that are fundamentally similar, rather than fundamentally dissimilar from ourselves? It is only the ethicist who wants to crouch the "rationality" of morality into our specific time and place in the course of human (or transhuman) existence. The nature of morality may too be a process of the evolution of humanity.

-Anthony

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